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Is brain activity observable that leads to an evaluation of 
a probability of 0.5 that is different from 0.5 in binary 
lottery choices? 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the problem of probability weighing in the evaluation of 
lotteries. According to Prospect Theory a probability of 0.5 has a weight of 
smaller than 0.5. We conduct an EEG experiment in which we compare the 
results of the evaluation of binary lotteries by certainty equivalents with the 
results of the bisection method. The bisection method gives the amount of 
money that corresponds to the midpoint of the utilities of the two payoffs in a 
binary lottery as it has been shown previously. In this method probabilities are 
not evaluated. We analyzed EEG data focused on whether a probability is 
evaluated or not. Our data show differences between the two methods 
connected with the attention towards sure monetary payoffs, but they do not 
show brain activity connected with a devaluation of the probability of 0.5. 
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Introduction and Theory 
In risky decision making Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992) is one of the most accepted theories. One 
central point in Prospect Theory is probability weighting. One key aspect of 
the probability weighting function is that the probability of 0.5 has a weight 
smaller than 0.5. We design an EEG study in which we try to find brain activity 
associated with the perception of the probability of 0.5. In a previous EEG 
study (Heldmann et al. 2008) the bisection method as a direct method 
without risk was compared with the certainty equivalent method as an 
indirect method that is connected with risk. Both methods are used for 
eliciting a utility function and this study revealed that the bisection method is 
suitable as a reference method for eliciting utility functions. We use these two 
methods to isolate the effect of the evaluation of the probability of 0.5 in the 
experimental design and in the EEG data. 
In the following part we shortly describe both methods and the problem in 
more detail. Then we present the experimental part with our results and the 
conclusion. 
 
Certainty equivalent method 
The certainty equivalent method elicits a utility function by determining 
certainty equivalents of lotteries in which the payoffs ?? and ?? occur with a 
probability of ?? ? ???. Based on decision of a subject between a binary 
lottery and a sure payoff, the certainty equivalent CE represents the sure 
payoff when the subject becomes indifferent between the lottery and the 
sure payoff. 
 
Bisection method 
Applying this method, a utility function is elicited by determining the amount 
of money CU that corresponds to the midpoint of the utilities of the two 
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amounts of money ?? and ??. During the experiment the subjects are asked 
to evaluate their perceived ‘happiness that money brings’ (Galanter 1962) in 
order to achieve a monetary valuation without using lotteries. This study uses 
the term ‘joy’ at receiving an amount of money when applying the bisection 
method in order to provide the subjects with a monetary valuation context 
(see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the bisection method for 
?? ? ? and ?? ? ???? 
Does CU equal CE? 
After comparing the prediction of models of decision theory for both methods 
it can be stated that CU will equal CE does not apply for all theories. While 
?? ? ?? can be reasoned by Expected Utility Theory, the same is not true for 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
due to its use of a Probability Weighting Function. 
If the utility function in both methods is normalized to 0 and 1 and the offered 
lottery of the CE method has a fifty-fifty chance (? ? ???), a theoretical 
comparison can be made as follows: 
The bisection method asks for the same difference of ‘joy’ between three 
outcomes ??, ?? and ??. This is achieved by perceiving ?? as the monetary 
amount corresponding to the midpoint of joy between ?? and ??. 
As far as normalization is concerned, the utility of ?? and ?? is ????? ? ? 
and ?????? ? ?. Thus, the utility of the perceived midpoint ?? is 
????? ? ?
??????????
?
? ?
?
. 
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The offered lottery of the CE method has two values ?? and ?? as in the 
bisection method. According to Expected Utility Theory, the utility of the 
certainty equivalent is equal to the probability p of the fifty-fifty lottery, since 
???????? ? ????? ? ? ? ????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???. Hence, the perceived 
midpoint of the difference of joy has the same utility as the certainty 
equivalent of an indifference decision between a fifty-fifty lottery and a sure 
payment. It follows that a comparison of these two methods will not yield 
different results if Expected Utility Theory holds. 
The CE method as used for the development of Prospect Theory differs in this 
comparison, given that the utility of an indifference decision between a sure 
outcome and a lottery does not equal the given probability p as a result of the 
weighting function, consequently ??????? ? ????? ? ???? ? ????? ?
??? ? ?? ? ??????. The Probability Weighting Function is stated to be 
inverse S-shaped, with a probability of 50 % being affiliated to a section of 
underweighting probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Camerer and Ho 
1994; Tversky and Fox 1995). Further studies (Gonzalez and Wu 1999; 
Abdellaoui 2000) also confirmed that the crossover point from an 
overweighting to an underweighting of probabilities is about ? ? ????. As a 
result, the value of ?????? is actually lower than 0.5, leading to the conclusion 
that a comparison of these two methods yields different results, namely 
????? ? ?????. 
Different results between CU and CE would also be expected by theories of 
Regret (Loomes and Sugden 1982), Disappointment (Bell 1985) and Tension 
(Albers et al. 2000), formed on the basis of additional effects throughout the 
decision process, such as emotional reactions etc. In order to investigate the 
neural underpinnings of risky and riskless decisions event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) were used, an EEG technique where brain potentials are 
recorded time-locked to external stimuli (Münte et al. 2000). Different ERP 
components can be characterized by three criteria: time, place and polarity of 
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the components’ appearance. The P300 (or P3), a positive deflection at 
centro-parietal electrode sites peaking at 300 ms or more after the stimulus’ 
presentation, is basically related to the cognitive processes like working 
memory, allocation of attentional resources, stimulus novelty and the 
stimulus’ dependence on a given task (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin 1977; 
Johnson 1988; Linden 2005; Polich 2007). Other cognitive processes having an 
impact on the P300 variability like stimulus frequency (Duncan-Johnson and 
Donchin 1977; Johnson 1988), emotional value (Pritchard 1981; Johnson 
1988; Picton 1992) or the stimulus’ relevance can be traced back to the 
aforementioned concepts. 
Coming back to the economical question that CU equals CE, the P300 can be 
utilized to reveal processes that are not reflected in observable behavior. For 
example, according to Prospect Theory the information of performing a 
lottery should result in a devaluation of the amount used in this task. But 
when does this devaluation take place? And is this devaluation reflected in 
the processing of the information when providing stimuli? In the present 
paper the focus is directed on the attention-capturing processes of the 
bisection method and the certainty equivalent method. The expected result 
for the riskless method would be less attention allocation processes 
compared to the method that is connected with risk. 
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Material and Methods 
Participants 
16 right-handed (9 women) and neurologically healthy subjects participated in 
this study after giving informed consent. They were paid 7 Euro per hour for 
their participation. 
 
Experimental procedure 
The subjects took part in two sessions which were scheduled two weeks 
apart. They were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a 19 inch CRT 
display. Each session started with a test block to familiarize the subjects with 
the task. It was the subject’s task to make decisions by clicking two mouse 
buttons with their left or right index finger. 
First, two numbers (?? and ??) were shown to the subject within a white 
frame (see figure 2), which turned into one out of two colors, either light blue 
or pink. According to this color codification, the subjects distinguished 
between two conditions: the CE method termed as ‘lottery condition’ and the 
bisection method termed as ‘bisection condition’. Then a third number was 
revealed, located between the numbers shown before, and the subjects had 
to make a decision by means of a YES/NO response. Finally the screen turned 
back into black. 
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Figure 2: Sequence of screens shown to the subject 
As for the lottery condition, the outer numbers represented payoffs of a fifty-
fifty lottery and the inner number a sure payoff. The subjects were asked 
whether they preferred a sure payoff (YES), or opted for playing the fifty-fifty 
lottery (NO). 
Additionally, for the bisection condition the outer numbers corresponded to 
the utility interval boundaries, while the inner number characterized the 
perceived utility interval center. The subjects had to decide whether they 
sensed the first utility interval as larger than the second utility interval (YES or 
NO) concerning the perceived joy at receiving these amounts of money. 
Hence, the question in both conditions resulted in asking whether the same 
interval had been perceived as larger or not (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of the experimental question for the CE method and the 
bisection method 
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Furthermore, identical numerical values were presented in both conditions. 
The left number ?? was constantly zero, while the right number ?? included 
15 different values that were placed around 1000. The inner number varied 
between seven categories, containing the exact arithmetic mean C of the two 
outer numbers as well as ranges of 50 units (C+50, C-50), 150 units (C+150, C-
150) and 300 units (C+300, C-300) from the center. All numerical values were 
multiplied by the factors 1, 10 and 100. Thus, not only values within the range 
of 1000 resulted, but additional values within the range of 10000 and 100000 
were also induced. 
Color codification and response configuration of the YES/NO answers to the 
right and left index finger were randomized among the subjects. The duration 
of the experiment was approximately one hour per session. The adjustment of 
the two conditions and the different number values during the experiment 
were distributed randomly.  
In order to examine the stimulus presentation of the inner number, a 
fragmentation into the seven categories and the following YES/NO responses 
was conducted. The NO answers, in this respect, represent negative 
deflections from the center position C, and the YES answers positive 
deflections. 
For analyzing the behavioral data only the averaged YES answers were taken 
into account, given that the NO answers are equivalent. 
 
EEG recording and analysis 
The electroencephalogram was recorded from 29 thin electrodes mounted in 
an elastic cap and placed according to the international 10-20 system. The 
EEG was re-referenced offline to the mean activity at the left and right 
mastoid. In order to enable the offline rejection of eye movement artifacts, 
horizontal and vertical electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded using bipolar 
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montages. All channels were amplified (bandpass 0.05 – 30 Hz) and digitized 
with 4 ms resolution, impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. 
EEG-data with eye blinks were corrected using a blind source separation 
method (Joyce et al. 2004). EEG-periods with pulse artifacts were excluded 
from the data set. Following the artifact procedure, stimulus-locked bins were 
calculated (epoch length 900 ms, baseline 100 ms) for each subject and the 
following conditions (see table 1). 
Table 1: Stimulus-locked bins for the EEG data 
Condition Inner Number 
Category 
Followed 
Response 
Bin 
Lottery Condition C-300 No C-300NoLott 
Lottery Condition C-150 No C-150NoLott 
Lottery Condition C-50 No C-50NoLott 
Lottery Condition Center No CenterNoLott 
Lottery Condition Center Yes CenterYesLott 
Lottery Condition C+50 Yes C+50YesLott 
Lottery Condition C+150 Yes C+150YesLott 
Lottery Condition C+300 Yes C+300YesLott 
Bisection Condition C-300 No C-300NoBisec 
Bisection Condition C-150 No C-150NoBisec 
Bisection Condition C-50 No C-50NoBisec 
Bisection Condition Center No CenterNoBisec 
Bisection Condition Center Yes CenterYesBisec 
Bisection Condition C+50 Yes C+50YesBisec 
Bisection Condition C+150 Yes C+150YesBisec 
Bisection Condition C+300 Yes C+300YesBisec 
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Results 
Behavioral data 
A within-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed for the 
behavioral data, with the condition, the inner number category and the scaled 
factor serving as inner subject factors. The ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference between both conditions (F=0.307, df=1, p=0.588). Further 
verification of both conditions using a paired t-test resulted in no significant 
values on a 5 % significant level (see table 3 in the APPENDIX). Figure 4 shows 
that both curves cross each other near the center position and are almost 
identical. 
 
Figure 4: Empirical distribution function of the YES-answers 
for both conditions 
Furthermore, a significant value is existent for the scaled factors (F=1.313, 
df=6.762, p=0.012), but not for other factor interactions (see table 3 in the 
APPENDIX). 
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EEG data 
The figures 5 and 6 show stimulus-locked ERPs at the CZ electrode for the bins 
described in the previous section. Most pronounced differences are located 
about 500 ms poststimulus. ERPs related to the center position (C-50, C, C+50) 
hardly deviate, whereas the categories C-300, C-150, C+150 and C+300 tend 
to have a larger positivity. Obviously, the most pronounced positivity is 
related to the bin in the lottery condition. 
ERP waveforms were analyzed by a set of ANOVAs, with the focus being 
directed on the mean amplitudes in different time periods and differentiated 
by the lateral, parasagital and midline location as well as by the followed 
response. 
A high significant difference could be determined at a time period of 
450-600 ms poststimulus (p<0.02, see table 4 and 5 in the APPENDIX) for the 
inner number categories. Based on a 5% significant level, no significant 
differences exist when regarding both conditions as within-subject factor (see 
table 3 and 4 in the APPENDIX); neither for the YES answers nor for the NO 
answers. 
 
Figure 5: Stimulus-locked ERPs of the inner number stimulus at the CZ electrode for 
the YES-answers 
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Figure 6: Stimulus-locked ERPs of the inner number stimulus at the CZ electrode for 
the NO-answers 
Furthermore, an ERP verification of the extreme categories C-300 and C+300 
had been conducted. Figure 7 and 8 present the voltage distribution among 
the scalp at 450-600 ms and the ERPs at the CZ electrode for these categories. 
It is obvious that the C+300 category of the lottery condition is marked by a 
higher positivity at the centro-parietal electrodes (CZ, PZ, CP2 and P4). A 
paired t-test for CZ and PZ revealed a significant difference for the C+300 
category (p<0.05, see table 6 in the APPENDIX). 
 
Figure 7: Stimulus-locked ERPs of the extreme categories at the CZ electrode 
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Figure 8: Voltage scalp distribution of the extreme categories 
Depending on the stimulus event of the colored frame presentation, the ERPs 
are not distinguishable, as seen in figure 9. Based on this identical pattern no 
further statistical test was deemed necessary. 
 
Figure 9: ERPs of the colored frame stimulus  
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Conclusion 
The experimental analysis shows three considerable results. First, there are no 
obvious differences between the bisection method and the CE method at the 
presentation of risk as well as for the behavioral data. Second, differences 
appear in the ERPs concerning the inner number categories. Third, the 
category C+300 in particular produces a high positive potential for the YES 
answers under the lottery condition. 
The characteristic of the evoked ERPs within the time period of 450-600 ms 
poststimulus shows that a P3 is existent. Given the assumption that a P3 
reflects a task-related attention, the statement can be made that a higher 
positive potential represents higher attention on that stimulus. 
The ANOVAs of the inner number stimulus revealed a very high significance 
for the time period of 450-600 ms, with the consequence that this stimulus 
will probably cause differences. ERPs of categories near the center position 
have a lower positive peak than categories further away from this center 
position, which is specifically category C+300 in the lottery condition. Thus, 
this stimulus induces a very high attention. Since in this category the sure 
payoff seems to be very attractive compared to the offered lottery, this 
potential could reflect the attractiveness of money or a pleasant surprise 
concerning the following sure payoff. 
The statistical analysis of the behavioral data shows no difference between 
the results of the CE method and the bisection method. It can be assumed 
that the perceived center of ‘joy’ equals the certainty equivalent, ?? ? ?? 
accordingly. Hence, the utility of both is ????? ? ????? ? ?
?
 and not 
????? ? ?????. There is no evidence that probabilities in risky choices are 
underweighted, as stated in the Prospect Theory. The EEG data shows no 
different attention on both methods at the presentation of risk. Thus, a 
distinct process of probability weighting or risk evaluation cannot be found. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2: ANOVA for behavioral data 
  Df F-value p-value 
Condition (Cond) 1 0.307 0.588 
Scaled Factors (Pot) 1.313 6.762 0.012 
Inner Number Category (Diff) 1.771 71.087 0 
Cond*Pot 1.39 0.221 0.722 
Cond*Diff 2.544 2.012 0.137 
Pot*Diff 5.593 0.87 0.515 
Cond*Pot*Diff 5.064 0.84 0.527 
Values corrected by Greenhouse-Geisser. 
 
Table 3: Paired t-test for behavioral data 
t-value Df p-value 
C-300: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
1.367 15 0.192 
C-150: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
1.006 15 0.33 
C-50: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
0.723 15 0.481 
Center: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
-0.38 15 0.709 
C+50: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
-1.227 15 0.239 
C+150: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
-1.199 15 0.249 
C+300: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
-1.306 15 0.211 
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Table 4: ANOVAs of ERPs of inner number stimulus for YES-answers 
Parasagital locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.56)=8.34c F(1.62)=7.71c F(1.78)=4.83a F(1.89)=3.35a 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff)   F(2.02)=12.17d F(2.62)=2.91a   
Condition (Cond)         
Hemisphere (Hem)         
Diff*Cond         
Ant*Diff        F(4.59)=3.24a 
Ant*Cond F(2.56)=3.73a F(1.93)=3.75a   F(2.43)=4.41a 
Hem*Diff          
Hem*Cond         
Ant*Diff*Cond         
Hem*Diff*Cond F(2.46)=3.97a F(2.26)=3.34a     
Lateral locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.42)=13.24d F(1.45)=12.89d F(1.64)=9.16c F(1.89)=7.16c 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff)   F(1.97)=9.44d     
Condition (Cond)         
Hemisphere (Hem)         
Diff*Cond         
Ant*Diff    F(4.47)=4.85d F(4.29)=3.04a F(3.70)=2.96a 
Ant*Cond         
Hem*Diff          
Hem*Cond         
Ant*Diff*Cond         
Hem*Diff*Cond   F(2.25)=3.24a     
Midline locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.18)=7.71b F(1.19)=11.54c F(1.31)=10.28c F(1.44)=7.63b 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff) F(2.52)=3.62a F(2.02)=13.15d F(2.77)=3.31a   
Condition (Cond)         
Diff*Bed F(2.10)=4.19a F(2.45)=2.92a     
Ant*Diff  F(3.08)=3.11a       
Ant*Bed          
Ant*Diff*Bed          
Values inside cells correspond to F values and df. ap<0.05; bp<0.01; cp<0.005; dp<0.001. 
Blank cells were not significant (p>0.05). Values corrected by Greenhouse-Geisser. 
Ant*Hem*Diff. Ant*Hem*Bed. Ant*Hem*Diff*Bed had no significant values 
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Table 5: ANOVAs of ERPs of inner number stimulus for NO-answers 
Parasagital locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.45)=7.48b F(1.43)=6.88b F(1.61)=4.38a F(1.82)=3.26a 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff)   F(2.16)=6.28c F(2.27)=3.03a   
Condition (Cond)         
Hemisphere (Hem)         
Diff*Cond         
Ant*Diff    F(3.50)=2.68a     
Ant*Cond         
Hem*Diff          
Hem*Cond         
Ant*Diff*Cond     F(4.66)=2.87a F(5.30)=2.30a 
Hem*Diff*Cond         
Lateral locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.51)=11.31d F(1.46)=11.51d F(1.52)=9.22c F(1.72)=8.47c 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff)   F(2.33)=4.39b     
Condition (Cond)         
Hemisphere (Hem)         
Diff*Cond         
Ant*Diff    F(5.30)=2.41a F(5.59)=2.89a   
Ant*Cond         
Hem*Diff      F(2.35)=4.19a   
Hem*Cond         
Ant*Diff*Cond       F(5.57)=2.59a 
Hem*Diff*Cond     F(2.11)=3.67a   
Midline locations 300-450 ms 450-600 ms 600-750 ms 750-900 ms 
Anterior-Posterior (Ant) F(1.25)=6.41a F(1.21)=10.77c F(1.28)=10.06c F(1.25)=8.07b 
Inner Number Category 
(Diff)   F(2.08)=7.19c F(2.24)=3.58a   
Condition (Cond)         
Diff*Bed         
Ant*Diff  F(3.20)=2.78a       
Ant*Bed          
Ant*Diff*Bed          
Values inside cells correspond to F values and df. ap<0.05; bp<0.01; cp<0.005; dp<0.001. 
Blank cells were not significant (p>0.05). Values corrected by Greenhouse-Geisser. 
Ant*Hem*Diff. Ant*Hem*Bed. Ant*Hem*Diff*Bed had no significant values 
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Table 6: Paired t-test for CZ and PZ electrode at C+300 and C-300 
t-value Df p-value 
CZ 450-600 ms. 
C+300 Lottery Condition 
C+300 Bisection Condition 
-2.192 15 0.045 
CZ 450-600 ms. 
C-300 Lottery Condition 
C-300 Bisection Condition 
0.092 15 0.928 
PZ 450-600 ms. 
C+300 Lottery Condition 
C+300 Bisection Condition 
-2.389 15 0.03 
PZ 450-600 ms. 
C-300 Lottery Condition 
C-300 Bisection Condition 
-0.167 15 0.869 
 
Table 7: Correlation of behavioral data 
N R p-value 
C-300: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.879 0 
C-150: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.768 0.001 
C-50: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.683 0.004 
Center: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.623 0.01 
C+50: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.675 0.004 
C+150: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.593 0.015 
C+300: 
Lottery Condition 
Bisection Condition 
16 0.706 0.002 
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